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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaint iff--Respondant , * Case No. 
vs . ) 
* 14607 
DAVID LEWIS MOORE, ) 
Defendant- -A ppellant. * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant--Appellant appeals from the judgmert upon a jury 
verdict in a c r imina l action brought against him by the State of Utah for an 
alleged violation of 58-37-8 , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to-wit, possess ing 
a controlled substance with intent to dis t r ibute the same for value, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A jury found the Defendant--Appellant guilty and the Defendant was 
subsequently sentenced notwithstanding Defendants motions for a "mistr ial1 1 
and n j u ro r challenges for cause11 which were denied by the Honorable Venoy 
Chris toffersen. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant--Appellant respectful ly prays that the verdict be vacated and 
set as ide and a new t r i a l o rde red . 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 14th day of April, 1976 the Honorable Venoy Christoffersen 
convened court to begin the trial of the Appellant--Defendant in the Firs t 
Judicial District Court in and for the County of Box Elder, State Of Utah, 
for the alleged crime of ' 'Possessing a controlled substance with the intent 
to distribute the same for value1' contrary to the law of the State of Utah, 
to-wit: 58-37-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The roll call of potential jurors was had and 24 out of 35 on the Jury 
List responded as present. (See Jury List and page 2, lines 13 through 15 of 
Court Transcript) 
Of the potential jurors present, sixteen of the twenty-four present 
were drawn, (See page 082 of Court Minutes and page 6, lines 29 and 30, 
through page 7, line 2 of Court Transcript) thus leaving eight in the jury panel 
not summoned to the jury box. 
The 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
sixteen drawn for potential jury duty were as follows: 
Marge K. Newman 
Lorna Nelsen 
Morris F. Rhodes 
Navelle N. Rhodes 
Clarence F. Westly 
Gerrald Lynn Sorensen 
June E. Paulsen 
Vaughn U. Larsen 
Miles D. Roundy 
Steven Misrasi 
Trent Thompson 
Ray Don Reese 
Dean C. Youngkeit 
Charles E. Noble 
S. Terry Rock 
Darrell Ravenberg 
(See Court Transcript, page 14, line 9, through page 15, line 22) 
Thereafter the said panel of sixteen potential jurors were questioned 
by the state, the defense and the court* 
That the prosecuting attorney, as one of his questions, said the fol-
lowing: 
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"Now let me ask you further a genera l question. Is the re any-
thing in any of your minds that I haven' t brought up that you think 
would prevent you from render ing a fair verdic t in this c a s e ? In 
other words , from enter ing the case and before you hear the evi-
dence with a completely neu t ra l m i n d ? n 
(See page 23, l ines 21 through 27 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
That thereaf ter Mr . Rock in r e sponse to the question said: 
,fIfeel very strongly against people that use or sel l na rco t i c s . I 
don't know whether I could be fair in a verdict or not. fr 
(See page 23, l ines 28 through 30 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
That thereaf ter the court asked the following question: 
MI will ask you, Mr. Rock, would you ass ign a t i t le of guilt or 
innocence to a person on that basis ? n 
(See page 24, l ines 2 and 3 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
Mr. Rock repl ied as follows: 
nI don't know how to answer that, Judge. I don't know how to 
answer that. I do have a very s t rong feeling against people that 
would se l l— , ! 
(See page 24, l ines 4 through 6 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
The court then asked Mr. Rock the next question: 
"Yes , I am su re we all have things that a r e very repuls ive to 
us . A m u r d e r of a young child or a rape of a young woman, this 
is very repuls ive in our own minds and I an su re that that very 
fact, the type of c r i m e , may a rouse a feeling in your mind against 
a person who would do that. But, what we a r e saying here is to 
find guilt or innocence, not make a judgment as to whether i t ' s a 
bad or good thing. We a re not saying or at tempting to say whether 
this is a good or a bad thing for a person to do, we a r e hear for the 
purpose of determining whether they a r e guilty or innocent. Do you 
think that you can si t as a person and l is ten to the facts and make 
that determinat ion r e g a r d l e s s of what the offense i s ? M 
(See page 24, l ines 7 through 18 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
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Mr. Rock ' s final rep ly was : 
"I s t i l l don't - - I s t i l l can ' t answer the question yes or no, I don't 
think. I am not su re in my own mind whether I would o r not* ,f 
(See page 24, l ines 19 through 21 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
Therea f te r , in r e sponse to the same question, Mr . Westly said the 
following: 
"Yes . About four or five y e a r s ago we were wi tnesses and caused 
a group of young people to be picked up on drugs . We were supposed 
to be called. We never did hear what happened, but we were there 
during the s ea rch and se i zu re of the m a t e r i a l s . The ambulance picked 
up the young g i r l that was involved. We went through the whole thing 
at the t ime it happened. ff 
(See page 24, l ines 24 through 30 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
That thereaf te r , counsel for the defense challenged for cause Mr. Rock 
and Mr. Westly which said challenge the court denied. (See page 28, l ines 21 
through 30, page 29,1 through 29 and page 30, l ines 1 through 21 of Court T r a n -
sc r ip t ) . 
That in the Voir Dire examination of the jury , defense counsel asked 
the following: 
MI do have one or two quest ions . You have indicated to Judge 
Chr i s to f fe rsen ' s question that you were not the client of ei ther my-
self and Mr. Bunderson and I would ask one more question. I don't 
believe that I have personal ly been acquainted with any of you. Have 
any of you had any past acquaintenceship with m e ? I don't r e ca l l any-
body. Are there any of you he re tha t ' s been a past client of Mr. 
Bunderson, the prosecut ing at torney h e r e ? None of you know h im? I 
p r e sume that none of you - - excuse m e , did I have a hand? Yes , s i r ? M 
(See page 26, l ines 13 through 21 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
That in r e sponse to the foregoing question, Mr . Reese acknowledged 
a past acquaintenceship with the p rosecu to r , Mr . Bunderson, and specifically, 
Mr. Rhodes of the jury panel remained s i lent . 
That during the noon luncheon, defense counsel observed the prosecut ing 
a t torney f ra terniz ing with two j u r o r s and specifically defense counsel heard Mr . 
Rhodes make the following comment to the p rosecu to r : 
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f,I always thought you were going to be a doctor. fl 
(See page 34, l ines 8 and 9 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
Whereupon defense counsel immediately made a motion for a m i s -
t r i a l , (See page 33, l ines 23 through 30, page 34, l ines 1 through 30, page 35, 
l ines 1 through 30 and page 36, l ines 1 and 2 of Court Transc r ip t ) 
That at the t ime that defense counsel made its motion for a mi s t r i a l 
the prosecutor s tated that Mr. Rhodes, the ju ro r , had approached him and 
s ta ted ,!I would like to get out of h e r e , lf or that he was in a hur ry to get out 
of he re . 
(See page 34, l ines 28 and 29 of Court T ransc r ip t ) 
That thereaf ter , Mr . Bunderson, in an apparent at tempt to patronize 
and placate the ju ro r , failed to call all of his wi tnesses . That Mr. Bunderson 
indicated to the jury in his opening Voir Dire that he would be calling James 
Allred, David Holly and Dennis Abel as wi tnesses , (See page 9, l ines 16 through 
24 of Court Transc r ip t ) and that the prosecution did, in fact, cal l J a m e s Allred 
and Dennis Abel but failed to call the third wi tness , David Holly, in an apparent 
at tempt to influence and patronize Mr. Rhodes and to comply with the j u r o r ' s 
r eques t to hu r ry the ma t t e r along, 
ISSUE OF LAW 
Point 1 
It is contended by the Defendant--Appellant that the t r ia l cour t ' s refusal 
to d i smiss two j u r o r s , both of whom indicated that as a resu l t of pr ior exper-
iences they did not feel that they could s i t with a completely neut ra l mind and be 
fair , is prejudicial e r r o r . 
Point 2 
It is also contended by the Defendant—Appellant that the fai lure of Mr. 
Rhodes, one of the j u r o r s , to d isc lose a p r io r acquaintenceship with the p ro -
secuting at torney when asked, is prejudicial e r r o r . 
Point 3 
It is further contended by the Defendant--Appellant that the p rosecu to r ' s 
f ra terniz ing with two j u r o r s during a noon break and his patronizing one of the 
j u r o r s , is prejudicial e r r o r . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
It is contended by the Defendant--Appellant that the two jurors who 
stated that prior experiences made it such that it would prevent them from 
rendering a fair verdict, should have been excused from the case. Defendant-
Appellant relies upon Crawford vs. Manning Utah Reporter 533-542 p 2d page 
1091, November 25, 1975. 
In the Crawford vs. Manning case, a juror stated that she had strong 
feelings concerning anyone who would sue to recover money for the death of 
another but later stated that she could render a verdict free of bias and pre-
judice. The trial court refused to excuse her notwithstanding the fact she was 
challenged for cause and there were eight additional jurors that could have 
taken her place. 
Justice Ellett stated in the unanimous opinion the following: 
"One doubts that a person who harbors strong feelings con-
cerning anyone who would sue to recover money for the death 
of another could be a fair and impartial juror. She should have 
been excused peremptorily and one of the eight surplus jurors 
placed in the box. 
It is no excuse to say that the verdict was unanimous and 
since six of the eight jurors could find a verdict, the e r ror was 
harmless . By exercising one of their peremptory challenges 
upon this prospective juror, plaintiffs had only two remaining. 
The juror which remained because the plaintiffs had no challenges 
to remove him may have been a hawk amid seven doves and im-
posed his will upon them. 
A party is entitled to exercise his three peremptory challenges 
upon impartial prospective jurors , and he should not be compelled 
to waste one in order to accomplish that which the trial judge 
should have done. n 
The case at hand is even more compelling than the Crawford vs. 
Manning case because in the present case the juror, Mr. Rock, was never able 
to say that he could render a fair verdict while in the Crawford vs. Manning 
case the juror ultimately said she could render a fair verdict. 
It should also be pointed out that the court could have easily dismissed 
Mr. Rock and Mr. Westly when challenged because an additional eight jurors 
were waiting and could have been drawn upon for the jury panel. 
Therefore, it is respectfully argued that the court1 s failure to honor 
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the Defendant's challenge to two j u r o r s both of whom had stated that because 
of pr ior exper iences they could not r ender a fair verdict , is prejudicial e r r o r . 
Thus causing the Defendant--Appellant to waste two challenges in o rde r to 
accomplish that which the t r i a l judge should have done. 
POINT II 
It is a lso contended by the Defendant--Appellant that the ju ro r Mr. 
Rhodes, whose fai lure to make a full d i sc losure of an acquaintenceship with 
the p rosecu tor , consti tuted prejudicial e r r o r . 
The law is s tated succinctly in 50 Corpus J u r i s Secundum as follows: 
"Prospec t ive j u ro r s must fully, fair ly and truthfully answer all 
questions on Voir Dire examination, and disclose any ma te r i a l in-
formation which might bear on their qualifications. ,! 
The proposit ion is further supported in Wood vs . Henley 296 N. W. 
657,296 Mich. 491 and O'brien vs . Vandalia Bus Lines 173 S. W. 2d 76 351 
M o . , 500. : 
MOn Voir Dire examination, prospect ive j u r o r s must fully, fairly 
and truthfully answer all questions directed to them so that challenges 
may be intellegently exerc i sed and unsuitable persons excused. n 
In the case of McHugh vs . Jones 16 N . Y . s 2d 258 29 N . E . 2d 76, it 
s tated re fe r r ing to j u r o r s as follows: 
HWhether or not specifically questioned, they should disclose any 
ma te r i a l information which might bear on their qualification. n 
When Mr. Rhodes failed to fully advise the defense of his acquaintence-
ship with the p rosecu tor , he failed to give the defense a full opportunity to make 
an intellegent challenge and the j u r o r ' s subsequent solicitation of the prosecutor 
and conversat ion with the prosecutor at the noon break susta ins the defense 's 
a rgument as the ju ro r would have surely been peremptor i ly challenged by the 
defense had it known of this intimacy. 
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POINT III 
The final contention cf the Defendant—Appellant is the impropriety 
of a juror conversing with the prosecutor during the noon break wherein 
the juror makes it known to the prosecutor that he is anxious for the trial 
to be completed quickly and the prosecutor subsequently accommodating the 
juror. 
The Defendant--Appellant relies upon The State of Utah vs. Billy 
Wayne Black Utah State Supreme Court #14211, Green Sheets Decision, 
dated June 16, 1976. In that case, Justice Ellett said the following which 
was the unanimous decision of the court: 
,fIt is generally considered to be improper for a juror to 
converse during the trial of a case with a witness unless he is 
authorized to do so. However, unless there is some showing 
of prejudice to the defendant, a conviction should be affirmed, 
notwithstanding the impropriety. This is especially true where 
the conversation is merely a remark of civility and not related 
to the case. The trial court afforded counsel for the defendant 
ample opportunity to examine the jurors but no prejudice was 
shown. f? 
It is Defendant--Appellants contention that it makes little difference 
whether the juror speaks to a witness or a prosecutor if there is a showing of 
prejudice as a result of said conversation and in the fact situation at hand, we 
find such an impropriety, to-wit: a juror making it known to the prosecutor 
that he is in a hurry and is anxious to get the trial over with and the prosecutor 
then accommodating the juror ' s wish by failing to call a witness which he had 
advised the jury he would call and the decision by the prosecutor not to call the 
witness being made after the conversation with the juror. 
The effect of the impropriety is obvious; the prosecutor did not wish 
to offend the juror who was in a hurry and indeed the very juror who had some 
personal acquaintenceship with the prosecutor. Whether the prosecutor and the 
juror were deliberate in their actions can never by known by the Defendant--
Appellant but in the conduct of a trial where a person's good name is at stake 
and his personal liberty, the Defendant--Appellant believes that not only im-
propriety should be avoided but also the appearance of impropriety. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the court 's refusal to dismiss two jurors who in response 
to a prosecutor 's question indicated that based on prior experiences they did 
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not think that they could render a fair verdict; and a juror ' s neglect or 
refusal to make a full and complete disclosure of an obvious prior acquain-
tenceship with the prosecutor; and the prosecutor's fraternization with two 
jurors during a noon break wherein a juror makes a request of the prosecu-
tor and the prosecutor subsequently patronizes the juror, it is respectfully 
submitted that the Defendant--Appellant did not receive a fair trial . 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Honorable Court 
order that a new trial for the Defendant--Appellant be held. 
Respectfully submitted, 
f
 ^ R R E L L G. RENSTROM 
Attorney for Defendant--Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Darrell G. Renstrom, attorney for Defendant--Appellant, hereby 
certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to Jon Bunderson, Assistant County Attorney, at his 
address at Box Elder County, Brigham City, Utah, this&tff ^ d a y of July, 
1976. 
